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I build a general equilibrium, ￿nancial accelerator model that incorporates an
explicit technology for the intermediary sector. A credit multiplier emerges be-
cause of a borrowing constraint that is a function of asset prices, internal funds
and lending rates. With this ￿nancial friction I show that small changes in the
productivity and intermediation costs of banks generate large and persistent ￿uc-
tuations in economic activity. The transmission channel relies on the role that
assets and internal funds play as collateral. After a negative shock hits ￿nancial
intermediation productivity, the resulting credit crunch and economic slowdown
induce a fall in asset prices and internal fund accumulation. This further modi￿es
the present and future volume of collateral, thereby amplifying and propagating
the initial shock. I argue that changes in banking regulation in Colombia in the
late 1990￿s increased intermediation costs, reduced banking productivity and in-
duced a credit channel story that ￿ts the theoretical model presented here. This
new regulation enhanced the credit crunch and economic slowdown that was al-
ready underway. Colombian data on loan/deposit interest rate spreads, credit
volume, asset prices and economic activity support this argument.
Keywords: Financial accelerator, banking productivity, intermediation costs,
borrowing limit, credit crunch, ampli￿cation, propagation.
JEL: E32, E42, E44, G21.1. INTRODUCTION
During the last three and a half years the economic performance of Colombia has
been disastrous. The unemployment rate has ￿uctuated around 18% in the seven
most important cities (and above 15% overall). The average growth rate for the
years 1998,1999 and 2000 was negative. In addition, an asset price plunge began
in late 1997. This situation contrasts with the early nineties when Colombia grew
at rates exceeding 4% and was catalogued as one of the top emerging markets
in the world. This economic downturn has been accompanied by a severe crisis
in the ￿nancial sector that began in late1997 or early 1998 [See Arias (2000)].
Since then, real credit has suﬀered a severe crunch. Between January of 1998 and
January of 2001 the stock of real credit fell 30%. Between July of 1999 and May
of 2000 more than 30% of the ￿nancial system￿s stock of assets was capitalized by
the government.1 Many other ￿nancial intermediary institutions failed and were
liquidated or bailed-out by the government. The ￿scal cost of the bail out has
been estimated at 6% of GDP.23
In order to alleviate the ￿nancial distress and to ￿nance the bail-out, the
Colombian government issued new banking regulation towards the end of 1998.4
For instance, whenever the outstanding value of a home mortgage debt exceeded
the market value of the home, debtors were given the right to repay completely the
debt by giving back their home to the ￿nancial institution that issued the credit.
The ￿nancial institution receiving the home was given the right to a loan from the
government equivalent to the value of the corresponding loss. The loan is to be
repaid at six month intervals during a ten year period at an interest rate equal to
forecasted in￿ation by the central bank plus ￿ve percentage points.5 Additionally,
an upper bound of 1.5 times the current bank interest rate was imposed on unpaid
home mortgage credits.6 The new regulation also prohibited banks from translat-
ing home mortgage repayment request expenditures to individual debtors.7 One
of the most controversial regulatory changes was a new tax on ￿nancial transac-
1Source: Banco de la Republica, Subgerencia de Estudios Economicos. See Arias (2000).
2Source: Foresight Colombia, July 4, 2000.
3The banking crisis in Colombia was parallel to a currency crisis. In 1999 the exchange rate
regime (a target zone) collapsed and the exchange rate was allowed to ￿oat ￿freely￿.
4Decree 2331, of November 16,1998. The new regulation can be consulted in:
http://juriscol.banrep.gov.co:8080/cgi/normas_buscar.pl
5Article 14 of Decree 2331.
6Article 15 of Decree 2331.
7Article 16 of Decree 2331.tions aimed at ￿nancing the bail-out and capitalization of troubled institutions.
Indeed, as of November 17, 1998 most ￿nancial transactions were to be taxed at
a 2 per 1000 rate.8 This rate was later risen to 3 per 1000.
The purpose of all this new regulation was to aid a troubled ￿nancial system.
Whether this was accomplished has not yet been determined. What is clear is
that the spread between the loan and deposit interest rates in Colombia system-
atically rose to higher levels in 1999, just after the new banking regulation and
￿nancial transaction tax was introduced. It is argued in this paper that this hike
in the loan-deposit interest rate spread re￿ects a rise in intermediation costs and
￿nancial ineﬃciency attributable to the new banking regulation. In other words,
the new regulation and the 2/1000 ￿nancial transaction tax tightened banking op-
erational constraints and introduced additional costs into ￿nancial intermediation
activity. Consequently, ￿nancial intermediaries suﬀered a productivity meltdown
as they lost operational versatility and additional real resources were required to
operate with and implement the new regulations and tax.9 As a result, ￿nancial
intermediaries had to charge a higher loan-deposit interest rate spread in equilib-
rium, as observed in the data. While aimed at alleviating ￿nancial distress, the
new regulation actually reduced the productivity of ￿nancial intermediaries and
increased intermediation costs.
This negative productivity shock to ￿nancial institutions exacerbated the credit
crunch and corresponding economic contraction that was already underway. But
this did not occur in a linear fashion. Interestingly, it seems that the Nov./1998
shock was signi￿cantly ampli￿ed and propagated into the future. Indeed, the data
show that after 1998 the economic contraction has been longer lived and more
persistent than most previous downward economic ￿uctuations in Colombia. This
paper pursues the idea that due to the new banking regulation of Nov./1998 and to
borrowing constraints attributable to the credit crunch that was already underway,
what otherwise would have been a regular and short-lived economic contraction
became the biggest economic downfall of recent Colombian history.
I suggest a general equilibrium model capable of replicating recent macroeco-
8Articles 29 and 30 of Decree 2331.
9In addition to the new banking regulation of Nov. 1998, between 1996 and 1999 new
regulation was also passed in Colombia ordering bankers to verify that deposits beyond a certain
volume did not come from illicit activities [Articles 102-107 from the Organic Statute of the
Financial System; Law 365 of 1997, articles 9,24 and 25; Law 526 of 1999, article11]. In carrying
out this police work, Colombian bankers have to spend additional time and resources before
they can accept and intermediate a deposit. This can be interpreted as an additional negative
productivity shock to the Colombian ￿nancial system.nomic regularities in Colombia. The model shows how a negative productivity
shock to ￿nancial intermediaries, interpreted as a perverse regulatory change for
the ￿nancial system, is ampli￿ed and propagated in macro aggregates due to credit
constraints. On an empirical level the contribution of the paper is a qualitative
and quantitative approximation to the recent macroeconomic behavior of Colom-
bia, in the light of its new banking regulation. In fact, it can be claimed that the
punchline of the paper is that the qualitative and quantitative predictions of the
model are in line with the recent behavior of macroeconomic variables in Colom-
bia if it is accepted that the new banking regulation of Nov/1998 was a negative
productivity shock to its ￿nancial system. Nonetheless, the model applies to any
other episode where the banking sector experiences a productivity shock. Thus,
on a theoretical level the contribution of the paper is important for evaluating the
welfare impact of regulatory changes and policies that modify the productivity of
banks in environments with ￿nancial frictions.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brie￿y relates the paper
to the existing literature. Section three presents the empirical facts regarding
the macroeconomic behavior of Colombia before and after the new banking reg-
ulation of Nov/1998. In section four I argue that this new regulation induced a
rise in intermediation costs and a corresponding slump of banking productivity
in Colombia. Section ￿ve suggests a theoretical model that rationalizes how a
negative productivity shock to the ￿nancial system can account for the observed
macroeconomic behavior in Colombia during the period 1998-2000. In section six
I use the model to implement a numerical experiment that simulates the response
of the arti￿cial economy to an adverse productivity shock in the ￿nancial system.
The idea there is to replicate qualitatively, and to some extent quantitatively, the
macroeconomic behavior of Colombia after the Nov/1998 regulation and the as-
sociated negative productivity shock to ￿nancial intermediation. The last section
concludes.
2. LINKS TO THE LITERATURE
Links between banking productivity and regulation in the ￿nancial arena have
been established in the literature. The idea is that with the tightening of reg-
ulatory constraints, banks tend to loose versatility in their operations and, con-
sequently, experience a fall in productivity. On the other hand, a deregulatory
process increases competitive forces in the ￿nancial system so that ￿banks not
allocating their resources eﬃciently would perish unless they could become morelike their eﬃcient competitors by producing more output with existing inputs￿.
[Semenick (2001), pp. 122].
Berg, Forsund and Jansen (1992) ￿nd a productivity fall in Norwegian banks
prior to the deregulation of the Norwegian ￿nancial system in the 1980￿s. They
also document a fast productivity increase in the post-deregulation years up to
1989. Their results indicate that the observed productivity gains were mainly due
to the convergence of ineﬃcient banks towards the production possibilities frontier
rather than a shift of the frontier itself. Berg et. al. (1993) expanded the study to
Finland and Sweden. Zaim (1995) documents similar results for Turkish banks.
Bhattacharya, Lovell and Sahay (1997) ￿nd that the impact of liberalization on
the productivity of Indian banks depends on the type of ownership. Gilbert and
Wilson (1998) argue that privatization of Korean ￿nancial institutions, rather than
deregulation of deposit interest rates, induced an increase in banking productivity.
Leightner and Lovell (1998) ￿nd that the average bank in Thailand experienced
rapid total factor productivity growth between 1989 and 1994, as the ￿nancial
and foreign exchange systems of this country were liberalized. Khumbakar et. al
(2001) study Spanish savings banks between 1986 and 1995, a period during which
the Spanish banking industry went through major regulatory reforms. They ￿nd
high levels of technical ineﬃciency but high rates of productivity growth due to
frontier shifts attributable to the deregulatory process.
In a recent paper Semenick (2001) computes the Malmquist index of U.S. com-
mercial banks with more than US$ 500 million in assets for the period 1980-1989.10
He divides his sample into those banks that are allowed statewide branching,
those with limited branching and those constrained to unit branching. He ￿nds
that during the 1980￿s the three groups of banks exhibit cumulated productivity
growth rates of 4.6%, 3.2% and -0.3%, respectively. In short, his results indicate
that banks facing tighter branching constraints exhibit less productivity growth
than those facing looser branching regulation. Humphrey (1991) studies the re-
lationship between deregulation and banking productivity in the US during the
1980￿s. He ￿nds that between 1977 and 1987 productivity growth of U.S. banks
ranges between -0.07% and 0.6% per year. He attributes this variation to the
deregulation of the 1980￿s. Other studies that ￿nd positive productivity growth
10The Malmquist index is computed with data envelopment analysis. The latter ￿is a lin-
ear programming methodology that constructs a non-parametric, piecewise-linear, best practice
frontier from observable input and output data￿ [Semenick (2001), pp. 122]. The index de-
composes productivity ￿uctuations into two elements: i) expansion of the frontier (technological
change) and ii) convergence towards the frontier (eﬃciency change or catching up).in U.S. banks during the 1980￿s (the decade of ￿nancial deregulation) are Hunter
and Timme (1991) and Bauer, Berger and Humphrey (1993). Tirtiroglu, Daniels
and Tirtiroglu (1998) look at a longer time period,1946 -1995, and document a
negative overall impact of regulation over U.S. commercial banking TFP growth.
In contrast, some studies have found negative or zero productivity growth rates
in the U.S. during the 1980￿s, the era of deregulation. Elyasiani and Mehdian
(1995) ￿nd a productivity regress in U.S. banks between 1979 and 1986, the pre
and post deregulation years. Humphrey and Pulley (1997) average data between
1977 and 1988 and also ￿nd productivity regress in U.S. banks during the 1980￿s.
Note that these results contradict the expected mapping between deregulation and
productivity growth. However, by studying only two spaced years or by averaging
out data these authors could have overlooked major productivity ￿uctuations in
U.S. banks during the years in between [see Semenick 2001]. These ￿ndings could
also indicate that banks face diﬃculties in their adjustment towards the increased
competition and freedom created by deregulation [Khumbakar et. al. (2001)].
Other studies that document zero or negative productivity growth rates in U.S.
banks during the 1980￿s are: Berger and Humphrey (1992), Humphrey (1993),
Bauer, Berger and Humphrey (1993) and Wheelock and Wilson (1999).11 In
any case, all the substantial empirical evidence documenting some link between
productivity of ￿nancial intermediaries and regulatory changes in the banking
arena motivates and is relevant to the idea behind this paper.
An environment that articulates some sort of credit channel seems the appro-
priate theoretical structure to study the recent Colombian case given the ongoing
credit crunch and contraction of the Colombian economy at the time the new
banking regulation was issued. Studies using ￿nancial accelerator models and
credit channel stories have already shown that conditions and frictions in ￿nan-
cial markets play a key role in explaining an economy￿s reaction to exogenous
macroeconomic shocks.12 These types of models can be classi￿ed in two cate-
11Very good surveys of all these studies can be found in Khumbakar et. al (2001) and Semenick
(2001).
12A ￿nancial accelerator is a self-feeding, internal ￿nance mechanism that propagates and
ampli￿es shocks. Usually, in this literature the ￿rm￿s ability to ￿nance its production plan is an
increasing function of the value of its assets. When the value of these assets increases (either
because the price of assets increases or because the ￿rm reinvests more pro￿ts), the ￿rm is able
to expand its production plan (either because some external ￿nance premium falls or because
borrowing limits become less stringent). A higher level of production and investment increases
asset demand (and asset prices) and/or earnings (and reinvestment of pro￿ts), thus increasing
even further the value of the ￿rm￿s assets and its ability to expand its production plan. And sogories: i) agency cost models13 and ii) borrowing limit models14. Unfortunately,
the role of productivity ￿uctuations in the ￿nancial sector has been overlooked by
these studies. The reason is that existing ￿nancial accelerator or credit channel
models lack an appropriate representation of the banking technologies through
which resources are intermediated. Indeed, most of these models treat ￿nancial
intermediation as a costless, invisible and intangible activity. This basically boils
down to assuming that the ￿nancial intermediary is simply an additional con-
straint in the economy [Chari, Jones and Manuelli. (1995)].15
The model suggested in this paper blends the ￿nancial regulation - banking
productivity empirical link and the ￿nancial accelerator literature in an attempt
to replicate the recent macroeconomic behavior in Colombia. It builds upon the
borrowing limit-￿nancial accelerator idea by using an environment similar to the
one suggested by Kocherlakota (2000). A diﬀerent feature is that banks operate
with a costly intermediation technology. For every unit of deposits they accept, a
fraction is lost in the intermediation process. This intermediation cost creates a
spread between the deposit and lending rates. It also determines the productivity
of intermediation. Naturally, a lower cost implies a higher productivity.
The model economy is populated by many households. Each one has access
to a technology that needs land, internal funds and external funds (from banks)
to operate. To avoid the risk of default banks impose a credit constraint on the
household: it cannot borrow beyond the value of its collateralizable resources
(value of landholdings plus internal funds). This credit constraint pushes up the
value of land. Whenever the borrowing constraint binds, land will be valued not
only because of its direct contribution to output (as an input of production), but
also because it contributes indirectly to output through the role that it plays
as collateral. Accumulating an additional unit of land increases the household￿s
on. The ￿nancial accelerator mechanism is at work. It is the basic source of propagation and
ampli￿cation of shocks.
13e.g.: Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke and Gertler (1990), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
14e.g.: Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Cooley and Quadrini (1999),
Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2000), Schneider and Tornell (2000), Kocherlakota (2000),
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000a, 2000b), Mendoza
(2001).
15Models with costly intermediation technologies have been used elsewhere in the literature
￿for banks to play a non-trivial macroeconomic role￿ [Edwards and Vegh (1997) pp. 246; see also
King and Plosser (1984), Diaz-Gimenez et. al. (1993) and Cole and Ohanian (2000)]. But this
literature assumes that the ￿nancial system is frictionless and, hence, ￿nancial intermediation
activities have a negligible macroeconomic eﬀect.future volume of collateral. More collateral tomorrow increases the future avail-
ability of external funds, thereby expanding future output indirectly. This feature
of the asset is not present in the Kocherlakota (2000) model either.
The punchline of the theoretical model suggested here is a credit channel that
ampli￿es and propagates small, transitory shocks to banking productivity. In fact,
small changes in the productivity of the intermediation technology generate large
and persistent ￿uctuations in economic activity. The credit channel arises because
borrowing constraints that depend on asset prices, internal funds and lending rates
induce static and dynamic credit multipliers a-la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
The transmission mechanism is triggered by a rise in lending rates that tightens
borrowing constraints on impact. The credit crunch is magni￿ed and propagated
by the fall in asset prices and internal fund accumulation that accompanies the
lower level of economic activity and that further tightens the credit limit on impact
and in the future.
3. COLOMBIA 1998-2000
Figures 1-5 present the evolution of the following macroeconomic variables in
Colombia16: i) real GDP cycle (1977:I-2000:III), ii) stock prices in real terms
(1991:01-2001:01), iii) gross and net of non-performing loans stock of real credit
(1992:01-2001:06), iv) ex-post real loan rate (1990:01-2000:02) and v) loan/deposit
interest rate spread (1986:01-2000:12). When ￿nancial distress erupted in Colom-
bia (end of 1997, beginning of 1998) its GDP entered into a cyclical contraction,
asset prices plunged, real credit was crunched and the real loan rate increased
signi￿cantly. As is well documented by the empirical literature [see Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (1998, 1999), Kaminsky (1999) and Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta
(2000)], this macroeconomic behavior is typical of credit crunch and ￿nancial dis-
tress episodes. Note also that during the initial phase (or year) of the crisis the
loan/deposit interest rate spread did not display any drastic ￿uctuation. There is
only an isolated hike in June of 1998.
But in 1999, just after the new banking regulation of Nov/1998 was introduced,
the loan/deposit interest rate spread systematically rose to higher levels. For in-
stance, the average spread between the nominal annual loan rate and the nominal
annual 3-month certi￿cate of deposit rate between Jan/1986 and Dec/1998 was
16A detailed description of the data is available in the Data Appendix.997 basis points. The corresponding average spread for the period Jan/1999-
Dec/2000 was 1166 basis points, a 17% increase with respect to the pre-1999
average. The average spread for the period Jan/2000-Dec/2000 was 1423 basis
points, a 43% increase with respect to the pre-1999 average.
After the regulation was issued, the economic contraction became wider and
longer lived than most other previous downward economic ￿uctuations in Colom-
bia (and only comparable to the mid-80￿s recession). Indeed, when the new ￿-
nancial transaction tax and banking regulation were implemented in the fourth
quarter of 1998, GDP was already 1.8% below trend. By the ￿rst and second
quarters of 1999, it declined further to 4.5% and 6.3% below trend, respectively.
Moreover, in the following quarters (and until 2000:III) GDP remained between
4.7% and 5.5% below its pre-1998:III trend value.
In a similar fashion, after the implementation of the banking regulatory changes,
asset prices maintained their downward momentum. In fact, by January of 2001
real stock prices had fallen to their 1991 level. This means that between December
of 1997 and January of 2001 a 60% fall in real stock prices was observed, with 26
of these percentage points being lost after December of 1998 (the date of the new
regulation). To put the severity of this crash in perspective, in the U.S. between
1929 and 1932 (the Great Depression) the S&P Index fell about 68% in real terms
[Cole and Ohanian (2000)]. Another familiar stock market crash episode is that
of Japan in the early nineties when the Nikkei Index fell about 55% in real terms
between 1989 and 1992 [Cole and Ohanian (2000)].17 The Colombian asset price
plunge exceeds that of Japan and is close to the one experienced during the Great
Depression in the U.S.
Additionally, once the new banking regulation was in place real credit was
further crunched in Colombia after a slight recovery in the third quarter of 1998.
For instance, comparing the total stock of real credit in January of 2001 with
its corresponding value in December of 1997 reveals a 30% fall, with 24 of these
percentage points being lost after December of 1998 (the date of the new regula-
tion). These numbers are higher if non-performing loans are not considered. The
realized real loan interest rate also displayed another peak around the time of the
new regulation. While the average for this rate between Jan/1990 and Dec/1997
was 14.68%, by the fourth quarter of 1998 this rate had more than doubled to
an average of 33.32%.18 On the eve of the Great Depression the U.S. commer-
17There have been stronger stock market crashes. For example, the decline in Thai equity
prices (in dollars) since their 1995 peak exceeds 80% [Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998)].
18The corresponding monthly values are 34.62%, 33.08% and 32.26% in October, Novembercial paper realized real interest rate rose 70% from 5.6% in the fourth quarter of
1927 to 9.5% in the fourth quarter of 1928 [Romer (1993)]. Yet, in Colombia the
corresponding jump was more than 100%.
I ns u m ,t h em a c r o e c o n o m i ce ﬀects of the initial credit crunch and the asso-
ciated economic contraction were enhanced dramatically after the new banking
regulation and ￿nancial transaction tax were implemented. Were the regulatory
changes responsible for the observed macroeconomic behavior? The next sec-
tion tries to answer this question. The underlying idea is that the new banking
regulation and ￿nancial transaction tax of November of 1998 constitute a neg-
ative productivity shock to ￿nancial intermediation that was also ampli￿ed and
propagated, turning what otherwise would have been a regular, short lived, eco-
nomic contraction into the deepest, downward, economic swing of recent history
in Colombia. Why was this shock ampli￿ed and propagated? Section ￿ve will
suggest a theoretical model with a ￿nancial imperfection that may answer this
question.
4. BANKING PRODUCTIVITY IN COLOMBIA AFTER
THE NOV/98 REGULATION
To pursue the argument that the regulatory changes of Nov/1998 turned out to
be an adverse productivity shock to the ￿nancial system, ￿rst consider a bank
that uses a constant returns to scale (crs) technology to intermediate resources.
Suppose that the bank accepts deposits at given rate R, uses the intermediation
technology to provide loans at rate ρ and, for every unit of deposits, loses z ∈ [0,1)
units in the corresponding intermediation process. Under this environment banks
behave competitively and are price takers so that in every period they solve the
following static problem:
Max{dt} (1 + ρt)(1 − zt)dt − (1 + R)dt
Free entry and exit drives pro￿ts to zero and in equilibrium banks produce










Intermediation cost z creates a spread between the lending and deposit rates.
In fact, the spread or ratio between the gross lending rate and the gross deposit
rate is a metric of the inverse of the average (and marginal) productivity of deposits
[1/(1−z)]. The higher the productivity of the ￿nancial system, the lower the ratio
between the gross lending rate and the gross deposit rate and vice-versa. This
result is important because it provides a simple way to measure productivity
changes in the ￿nancial sector using observed data of the gross lending rate to
gross deposit rate ratio or spread.
Using this result, ￿gure 6 measures the inverse productivity of the ￿nancial
system in Colombia during the period Jan/1986-Dec/2000. In particular, it shows
the behavior of the ratio between the gross annual nominal loan rate and the gross
annual nominal 3-month certi￿cate of deposit rate.19 Note that this ratio displays
a fairly steady pattern until January of 1999. Beginning in January of 1999, less
than two months after the new banking regulation and ￿nancial transaction tax
was introduced, this ratio took a dramatic hike. For instance, between Jan/1986
and Dec/1998 the average for this ratio was 1.33. The average for this ratio during
the period Jan/1999-Dec/2000 was 1.81. This represents a 33.14% increase with
respect to the pre-1999 average. The average for this ratio during the period
Jan/2000-Dec./2000 was 2.17. This represents a 63.36% increase with respect to
the pre-1999 average.
Assuming the ￿nancial structure of the economy is as simple as the one sug-
gested in the previous paragraphs, it is possible to back up the corresponding
percentage change in the productivity of the banking sector (1−z) with the per-
centage change in the ratio between the gross loan and deposit interest rates. Let








19The annual nominal loan rate is ￿tasa activa total sistema￿ (monthly average) calculated by
Superintendencia Bancaria in Colombia. Two diﬀerent annual nominal deposit rates are used:
￿ t a s ad ei n t e r e sd el o sC D Ta9 0d i a s ,t o t a ls i s t e m a ￿( m o n t h l ya v e r a g e )a n d￿ t a s ad ei n t e r e sd e
los CDT a 90 dias, bancos y CF￿ (monthly average). Source is Banco de la Republica. Period
is 1986:01-2000:12. See Data Appendix.where • symbolizes a derivative with respect to time. As expected, any change
in the ratio between the gross loan and deposit interest rates maps back into
an equiproportional opposite sign change in ￿nancial intermediation productivity.
Thus, the data reveal a drastic negative productivity shock to ￿nancial intermedi-
aries in Colombia right after the new banking regulation was issued. According to
the data, if the ￿nancial system of Colombia were as simple as the one suggested
above, the banking productivity meltdown following the regulatory changes of
Nov/1998 would range from 30% to 60%!
This evidence might have some ￿aws. First, the Colombian ￿nancial system
is far more complex than the one depicted above and the Jan/1999 rise in the
loan-deposit interest rate spread might be capturing other phenomena like i) the
sudden deterioration of loan quality, ii) an increase of banking risk due to the
increase in macroeconomic instability (i.e. frequent and high swings in the real
interest rate) and the maturity mismatch between deposits and loans and/or iii) an
increase in noncompetitive practices as several banks failed and were removed from
the market.20 Furthermore, it can be argued that the fact that the jump in the
spread coincides with the implementation of the new banking regulation is simply a
coincidence. In fact, the three phenomena mentioned above also occurred around
the time the new regulation was being implemented. Hence, a very skeptical
reader might argue that the behavior of the domestic loan-deposit interest rate
spread after Nov/1998 does not necessarily imply, for a more realistic ￿nancial
sector, that the productivity of ￿nancial intermediaries fell back 30%-60% due to
t h eb a n k i n gr e g u l a t i o ni s s u e di nt h a td a t e .
However, three important facts support the claim that there is an element
of response in the Colombian loan-deposit interest rate spread to the regulatory
changes of Nov/1998. First, the new banking regulation of Nov/1998 was a major
change in the rules of the banking arena game in Colombia. Second, the spread
jump occurs some days after and not days before or at the same time the new
regulation was issued. Third, the range of the spread jump (30%-60%) is big
enough so as to allow, among other phenomena, for the presence of a negative
productivity shock in the ￿nancial system of the Colombian economy.
20Using panel data techniques and monthly data available for 22 commercial banks for the
period 1992-1996, Steiner, Barajas and Salazar (2000) ￿nd that non-￿nancial expenses are a
statistically signi￿cant component of the loan-deposit interest rate spread in Colombia and
that, on average, non-￿nancial expenses explain 27.6% of such spread. However, they also ￿nd
that the rest of the spread is explained by non-performing loans (34.4%), reserve requirements
(22.1%) and market power (15.9%).Figure 7 provides additional evidence that the Jan/1999 loan-deposit interest
rate spread jump implies, at least partially, a productivity regress of the Colom-
bian ￿nancial sector due to the Nov/1998 banking regulation. Speci￿cally, this
picture shows the quarterly evolution of a proxy for labor productivity in the ￿-
nancial sector of the Colombian economy during the period Mar/1992-Dec/2000.
The proxy is constructed as the ratio between the stock of real credit (including
non-performing loans) from the whole ￿nancial system and the number of ￿nan-
cial sector employees in the seven main metropolitan areas.21 In order to obtain
labor productivity proxies for the diﬀerent types of ￿nancial institutions that exist
in Colombia, the stock of real credit from the whole system is also disaggregated
into credit from banks, credit from savings and mortgage loan institutions (CAV),
credit from ￿nancial corporations (CF) and credit from companies of commercial
￿nance (CFC).
The labor productivity indicator fell 4.59% for the whole system between
Dec/1997 and Dec/1998, the ￿rst year of ￿nancial distress. This is not surpris-
ing. In particular, the labor productivity indicator increased 9.12% for banks and
fell 29.16%, 11.93% and 14.35% for CAV, CF and CFC, respectively, during that
￿rst year of crisis. This is not surprising either if one thinks that ￿nancial dis-
tress erupted more severely in the three latter types of ￿nancial institutions than
in banks. Between Dec/1998 and Dec/2000, the period comprising the ￿rst two
years in which the new regulation was in eﬀect, the labor productivity proxy fell
18.78% for the whole system. This represents, for each of these two years, a fall
in ￿nancial intermediation productivity twice as large as the one observed during
the ￿rst year of the crisis. Furthermore, during this period the labor productiv-
ity proxy fell 3.79%, 54.83%, 9.28% and 32.96% for banks, CAV, CF and CFC,
respectively. It is also worth noting the sharp falls in labor productivity of the
whole system and of banks in the ￿rst and fourth quarters of 1999, the ￿rst year
during which the regulation was in place.
The story is very simple. When ￿nancial distress erupted towards the end
of 1997, labor productivity in the Colombian ￿nancial sector began to erode as
a whole (4.6%). Even though the labor productivity of banks was still growing,
21During credit crunch episodes the level of ￿nancial activity is better proxied by the outstand-
ing stock of real credit (including non-performing loans) rather than by the corresponding ￿ow
of new real credit. The reason is that possible disintermedation amid ￿nancial distress might
yield negative new credit ￿ows for some years. Additionally, monitoring clients or dealing with
non-performing loans also represents activity for the banking sector and this is not captured by
the ￿ow of new loans.that of the other type of ￿nancial institutions was falling suﬃciently so as to
drive down the whole system￿s labor productivity level. After the new banking
regulation was in place in December of 1998, labor productivity of all types of
￿nancial institutions began to plunge and continued to do so during the next two
years. In fact, during this period the system as a whole lost almost an additional
one ￿fth (18.8%) of its former labor productivity level. The biggest contribution to
this fall came from savings and mortgage loans institutions. As above, the evidence
suggests that the new banking regulation of Nov/1998 constitutes a visible and
signi￿cant negative productivity shock to ￿nancial intermediation in Colombia.
In the next section a model capable of rationalizing the empirical facts of
sections two and three is suggested. The ultimate objective is to construct an
arti￿cial economy in which to study the eﬀects of a negative banking productivity
shock similar to the one observed in Colombia towards the end of 1998, and to
compare the response of this arti￿cial economy to that observed in Colombia
during the years 1999 and 2000, the post shock/post-regulation years.
5. MODEL
This section suggests a theoretical model that predicts a macroeconomic behavior
similar to the one observed in Colombia between the end of 1997 and the end
of 2000. Again, the idea is to use this model in order to replicate qualitatively
and quantitatively the response of the main macro aggregates in Colombia to the
negative productivity shock to ￿nancial intermediaries in late 1998.
5.1. Basic Assumptions
The economy is inhabited by an in￿nite number of identical, in￿nitely-lived, risk-
averse entrepreneurial households. The mass of households has measure 1.I n
every period households have access to a riskless technology that needs land and
internal and external funds as inputs to produce ￿nal good as output. The three
inputs are complementary in production. Internal funds and land are accumulated
by the household from one period to the other. External funds are supplied by a
banking sector in the form of intraperiod loans at rate ρ. Total land supply is ￿xed
at 1. Internal funds represent installed physical capital belonging to the household
while external funds should be interpreted as working capital provided by ￿nancial
intermediaries. One possible motivation for this loan-in-the-production function
assumption is that ￿rms usually need to pay for some intermediate inputs (orlabor services) in advance of production and must rely on the liquidity provided
by banks to do so. Without these liquid external funds ￿rms could not operate
their technologies. In this sense, external funds can be understood as a diﬀerent
input of production.
Banks operate with a costly, crs, intermediation technology. For every unit
of deposits they accept, a fraction z is lost in the intermediation process. Note
that this cost determines the productivity of intermediation. Of course, a lower
cost implies a higher productivity. It is assumed that banks take intraperiod
deposits from international ￿nancial markets at rate R. This rate is exogenously
determined by supply and demand conditions in foreign credit markets.
Even though the household￿s technology is riskless (i.e. free of shocks), fund-
ing the household is risky for the bank. In every period the household has the
option of running away with the proceeds from the project (i.e. the technology￿s
output) without paying back the loan to the bank. But in doing so the household
must leave its total assets (i.e. land plus undepreciated internal funds) behind.
Moreover, default is not penalized with market exclusion. Banks know of this pos-
sibility and so they take care not to let the household borrow more than the value
of its landholdings plus undepreciated internal funds. In other words, to avoid the
risk of default banks impose a natural credit constraint on the household. The
household cannot borrow beyond the value of its collateralizable resources (value
of landholdings plus undepreciated internal funds).
Note that agents can trade in three markets [relative price of each market
in (•)]: i) ￿nal good (1), ii) land (q) and iii) loans (ρ).T h e o r d e r o f e v e n t s i n
every period is very simple. When the household wakes up in any given period
it has some internal funds (x) and some landholdings (l).A tt h es a m et i m et h e
productivity of the banking sector [i.e. its intermediation cost (z)]i sr e v e a l e d .
The levels of z and R determine the equilibrium lending rate (ρ) that will be
charged by banks for any intraperiod loan. Additionally, the price of land (q) has
been simultaneously determined in the land market.
Since the marginal cost of a loan (1+ρ) is known at this point, the household
now determines its optimal demand for external funds or loans (b∗).H o w e v e r ,
because of the credit constraint, the volume of loans that the household ￿nally
receives (b) need not be equal to the optimal volume (b∗). If the outstanding value
of debt associated to the optimal loan volume (1+ρ)b∗ is less than or equal to the
household￿s total volume of collateralizable resources [ql+(1−δ)x where δ is the
depreciation rate of internal funds], then the household is not credit constrained
and its demand for loans is satiated completely:b = b
∗ !
ql +( 1− δ)x
(1 + ρ)
Otherwise, the household￿s credit constraint binds and the volume of external
funds received is equivalent to:
b =




The volume of loans extended to the households determines the volume of
deposits (d) taken by domestic banks from international ￿nancial markets. With
x, l and b the household operates its technology F(x,b,l). After production takes
place, resources available to the household in terms of ￿nal good are given by
F(x,b,l)+( 1− δ)x + ql. The household allocates these resources to four uses:
i) consumption (c), ii) accumulation of internal funds (x ), iii) purchasing of land
for next period (ql ) and iv) repayment of the outstanding debt [(1 + ρ)b].
Note that it is optimal for the household to repay the loan because the credit
constraint imposed by ￿nancial intermediaries is simply an incentive compatibility
constraint aimed at repayment. Keeping in mind that default is not penalized with
market exclusion, whenever the household ￿ees at the end of a period without
paying back its debt it receives a payoﬀ equivalent to:
F(x,b,l)
However, if it stays and pays back the loan, it will obtain a payoﬀ equivalent
to:
F(x,b,l)+ql +( 1− δ)x − (1 + ρ)b
Incentive compatibility with repayment requires:
F(x,b,l) ! F(x,b,l)+ql +( 1− δ)x − (1 + ρ)b
or:
b !
ql +( 1− δ)x
(1 + ρ)
which is simply the credit constraint imposed by banks on households. Thus, it
is always optimal for households to repay any loan extended to them. As in other
credit limit models, borrowing is so tightly constrained by the level of collateral
that default never occurs in equilibrium.5.2. Household￿s Problem







ct + xt+1 + qtlt+1 +( 1+ρt)bt = F(xt,b t,l t)+( 1− δ)xt + qtlt
bt(1 + ρt) ! qtlt +( 1− δ)xt
ct,x t,l t " 0
qt,ρt given
x0,l 0 =1given
It is assumed that Fij(x,b,l)=Fji(x,l,b) > 0 # i,j =1 ,2,3.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
land, internal funds and external funds are complementary inputs in the pro-
duction technology. The complementarity assumption between land and internal
funds is also used by Kocherlakota (2000). More on this complementarity assump-
tion ahead. Note also that if the constraint is binding, any fall in asset (i.e. land)
prices, in landholdings or in internal fund volume and any lending rate hike will
tighten the constraint.
Let λt represent the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated to the borrowing con-
straint. λt can be interpreted as the shadow price of collateral. Optimality con-
ditions for the household are:
λt =





 (ct+1)[F1(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1)+( 1− δ)] + λt+1(1 − δ)} (2)
qtU
 (ct)=βEt{U
 (ct+1)[F3(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1)+qt+1]+λt+1qt+1} (3)
Equation (1) is a key result of the model. It establishes that if F2(xt,b t,l t) >
(1+ρt) then λt > 0 and the borrowing constraint binds. Contrarily, if F2(xt,b t,l t)=
(1+ρt) then λt =0and the borrowing constraint does not bind. Simply put, the
entrepreneurial household always wants a level of external funds that equates the
marginal productivity of this input to the gross loan rate. The latter is simply
the marginal cost of external funds. Of course, optimality dictates that marginalproductivity and cost of external funds always be equated. However, if the opti-
mal level of external funds exceeds the borrowing limit, this optimality condition
is not possible. In this case the household will take as higher a loan volume as it
can and the borrowing constraint will bind. Moreover, the marginal productivity
of external funds will exceed its marginal cost (or gross loan rate) and an ineﬃ-
ciency will result in the economy. As a result, the demand for external funds will








> 1+ρt then bt =
qtlt +( 1− δ)xt
(1 + ρt)








≤ 1+ρt then bt   F2(xt,b t,l t)=( 1+ρt) and λt =0
The Euler Equation governing the consumption-internal fund accumulation
decision of the household follows from equations (1) and (2):
U
 (ct)=βEt{U
 (ct+1)[F1(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1)+( 1− δ) (5)




The left hand side (lhs) of (5) captures the marginal loss of utility from ac-
cumulating an additional unit of internal funds for next period. The right hand
side (rhs) captures the expected present discounted value of the corresponding
marginal utility gain. As (5) states, along the optimal consumption-internal fund
accumulation path the marginal loss and gain of accumulating an additional unit
of internal funds must always be equated. Note, however, that the marginal
bene￿t of accumulating an additional unit of x has two components. The ￿rst
one is standard and is presented in the ￿rst line of (5). Since x is an input of
production, accumulating an additional unit of x rises next period￿s output in
F1(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1) and its undepreciated part can be sold for (1 − δ). The second
component reveals the value of internal funds as collateral and is presented in the
second line of (5). Accumulating an additional unit of x loosens next period￿s
credit constraint in (1 − δ)/(1 + ρt+1). Each of these additional units of avail-
able external funds generate a net gain of [F2(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1) − (1 + ρt+1)] units
of output to the entrepreneurial household. Note that this gain is only relevant
if the borrowing constraint is binding [i.e. only if F2(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1) > (1 + ρt+1)and λt > 0]. In consequence, as long as the borrowing constraint binds the collat-
eral properties of internal funds enhance their marginal contribution to output.
Equation (5) is very important to the story of the paper. It dictates consumption
smoothing to the household. Hence, it also captures the household￿s incentive to
cut internal fund accumulation whenever there is a reduction in revenues such as
the one that results after a credit crunch is triggered by a lending rate hike due
to a fall in banking productivity.
The pricing equation for land follows from (1) and (3):
qtU
 (ct)=βEt{U
 (ct+1)[F3(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1)+qt+1 (6)




The lhs of (6) captures the marginal utility loss from buying an additional unit
of land for next period. The rhs portrays the expected present discounted value
of the corresponding marginal utility gain. As shown by (6), along the optimal
consumption-land accumulation path the marginal loss and gain of buying an
additional unit of land must always be equated. As with internal funds, the
marginal bene￿t of purchasing an additional unit of land comes from two sources.
The ￿rst source is typical and is presented in the ￿rst line of (6). Since land is an
input of production, purchasing an additional unit of land increases next period￿s
output in F3(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1) and, afterwards, that unit of land can be sold for qt+1.
The second source comes from the value of land as collateral and is presented in
the second line of (6). Buying an additional unit of l loosens next period￿s credit
constraint in qt+1/(1 + ρt+1). Each of these additional units of available external
funds generate a net gain of [F2(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1) − (1 + ρt+1)] units of output to
the entrepreneurial household. Again, note that this gain is only relevant if the
borrowing constraint is binding [i.e. only if F2(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1) > (1 + ρt+1) and
λt > 0]. In sum, as long as the credit constraint binds the collateral properties of
land enhance its marginal contribution to output.
Iterating forward on (6) and imposing a no-bubble condition reveals an ex-


















As usual, the price of land is given by the expected present discounted value of
its forever ￿ow of future rental payments. Discounting is done with the stochastic
discount factor as with any other asset. As expected, future rental payments
to land include not only its future direct contribution to output as an input of
production [F3(xt+j,b t+j,l t+j)], but also its future cumulated indirect contribution






. Of course, land￿s indirect contribution to future
output as collateral is only relevant if the borrowing constraint binds at least for
some future period [i.e. if F2(xt+j,b t+j,l t+j) > (1+ρt+j) and Ωt+j > 1 for some j
" 1].
Equation (7) is a nice result because it shows that credit constrained agents
value assets not only for their future direct rental payments but also for their
future role as collateral. But equation (7) also reveals the reason for assuming
complementarity in the three inputs of production x,b and l. As evidenced in (7),
rental payments to land are an increasing function of the marginal productivity of
land (l) and external funds (b). Complementarity between x and (b,l) implies that
a reduction in internal fund accumulation (i.e. a fall in x ) reduces F3(x ,b  ,l  )
and F2(x ,b  ,l  ) or Ω . Hence, a credit crunch that induces a cut in x  also induces
a fall in future rental payments to land and, consequently, a fall in its current
price (q), thus triggering the credit multipliers (more on the credit multiplier
ahead). Complementarity is what articulates the transmission channel from the
credit crunch to asset prices and back to the credit constraint. Of course, either
complementarity between x and l or between x and b is enough to do the trick.
But assuming both generates a bigger kick out of the credit multiplier.
5.3. Financial Structure and Bank￿s Problem
Banks are modelled in the same way as in section four, where it was argued
that the new banking regulation of Nov/1998 in Colombia induced a negative
productivity shock to ￿nancial intermediaries. Banks own a crs technology to
intermediate resources from international ￿nancial markets to domestic entrepre-
neurial household projects. Speci￿cally, banks accept deposits from foreign credit
markets at rate R. This rate is exogenously determined by demand and supply
conditions in those markets. Banks use the intermediation technology to provideintraperiod safe loans to domestic households at rate ρ.N o t et h a t(1 + ρ) is the
relative price of banking output.
The intermediation technology is costly in the sense that, for every unit of
deposits, z ∈ [0,1) units are lost in the intermediation process. Recall that this
captures the idea that in order to intermediate deposits into loans, banks have to
carry out a variety of costly activities like evaluating creditors, managing deposits,
renting buildings, maintaining ATMs, etc. [Edwards and Vegh (1997)]. Thus, in
every period the volume of intermediated resources is given by:
I =( 1− z)d
This technological speci￿cation is similar to the one used by Cole and Ohanian
(2000). In their paper the intermediation technology is G(D,Z) where D is unin-
stalled physical capital, Z is intermediation capital (in ￿xed supply), G(•) ex-
hibits crs and D − G(D,Z) " 0 captures resources used in the intermediation
process. Under the technology speci￿ed here there is no intermediation capital
but there is a productivity parameter (1 − z) playing an analogous role. There is
no uninstalled physical capital either but deposits d p l a yt h es a m er o l e .F i n a l l y ,
under this speci￿cation resources lost in the intermediation process are given by
d − I = d − (1 − z)d = zd < d.
With crs in the intermediation technology it is possible to assume an atomistic
structure in the banking industry. This assumption is also consistent with the fact
that ￿rms of many sizes coexist in the ￿nancial sector. Under this environment
banks behave competitively and are price takers. Formally, in every period banks
solve the following static problem:
Max{dt} (1 + ρt)(1 − zt)dt − (1 + R)dt
Free entry and exit will drive pro￿ts to zero so that in equilibrium banks






Equation (8) is crucial to the results of the paper because it shows that any
shock to banking productivity is transmitted to the borrowing constraint through
the lending rate (ρ). Note that the intermediation cost (z) also creates a spread





This last equation shows that the ratio between the gross lending rate and
the gross deposit rate is a metric of the inverse of the average (and marginal)
productivity of deposits [1/(1 − z)]. The higher the productivity of the ￿nancial
system, the lower the ratio between the gross lending rate and the gross deposit
rate. Recall that this result was important in section three because it provided a
way to measure productivity changes in the ￿nancial sector using observed data.
Finally, it is assumed that z ∈ [0,1) moves according to a stochastic process
Γ. In other words, the intermediation cost ￿uctuates randomly through time.
5.4. Market Clearing Conditions
In this economy markets clear if:
bt =( 1− zt)dt =⇒ loans market (9)
lt =1 = ⇒ land market (10)
ct +xt+1 = F[xt,(1−zt)dt,1]+(1−δ)xt −(1+R)dt =⇒ final good market
(11)
At this point equilibrium concepts must be de￿ned. First a stationary equilib-
rium for the non-stochastic version of the model is introduced. Next, a recursive
competitive equilibrium for the stochastic version of the model is de￿ned. The
latter facilitates the solution for the numerical experiment below.
5.5. Stationary Equilibrium
Under the non-stochastic version of the model z must be set at its unconditional
mean E(z).
De￿nition 1. A stationary equilibrium is the vector ζss =( css,x ss,l ss,b ss,d ss,z ss,q ss,ρss)
that solves:
bss =

































css = F[xss,b ss,1] − δxss − (1 + R)dss (7ss)
zss = E(z) (8ss)
5.6. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Whenever the economy is shocked out of steady state a diﬀerent equilibrium con-
cept must be used. Due to its usefulness in the experiment that follows, the
concept of recursive competitive equilibrium is now introduced. Let S =( z,X)
be the aggregate state vector and s =( x,l) be the household￿s individual state
vector.
De￿nition 2. P1 is the following dynamic programming problem for the house-
hold
V (S,s)=Maxs!,b{U[F(x,b,l)+(1−δ)x+q(S)l−x  −q(S)l  −(1+ρ(S))b]+





S  =[ Γ,H(S)]
De￿nition 3. P2 is the following static problem for the bank
Maxd [1 + ρ(S)](1 − z)d − (1 + R)d
De￿nition 4. A recursive competitive equilibrium is
1. A value function: V (S,s).
2. A set of individual decision rules: s (S,s) and b(S,s).3. A demand for deposits: d(S).
4. A set of pricing functions: q(S) and ρ(S).
5. A stochastic process and an aggregate law of motion: [Γ,H(S)].
such that:
￿ Given (4) and (5), (1) and (2) solve (P1).
￿ Given (4), (3) solves (P2).
￿ Markets clear:
1. l (z,X,X,1) = 1
2. b(z,X,X,1) = (1 − z)d(z,X)
￿ Aggregate Consistency: x (z,X,X,1) = H(z,X).
5.7. Credit Channel
In this economy there is a credit channel which is articulated by a static and
dynamic multiplier a-la-Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The multipliers propagate
and amplify any change in banking productivity. Consider an adverse productiv-
ity shock to banks meaning that their intermediation cost goes up. This would
induce a contemporaneous hike in the loan rate charged by banks in equilibrium.
The jump in the loan rate immediately tightens the borrowing limit of the house-
hold. As a result, households suﬀer a crunch in the volume of external funds or
working capital available to them. Their ability to ￿nance production is reduced
with this credit crunch. As their revenue falls, they instantaneously reduce their
accumulation of internal funds in an attempt to smooth out consumption. Recall
that land is an asset and, as such, its price is given by the present discounted value
of its forever ￿ow of future rental payments. As shown previously, these rental
payments have two components. The ￿rst one comes from the direct contribution
of land to future output as an input of production. The second one comes from
land￿s indirect contribution to output as collateral (recall that accumulating more
land today increases external fund availability tomorrow and, thereby, tomorrow￿s
output, as long as the borrowing constraint binds). Not surprisingly, these rental
payments are an increasing function of the future marginal productivity of landand external funds. Since internal funds are complementary to both land and ex-
ternal funds, the instantaneous reduction in internal fund accumulation implies a
fall in the future marginal productivity of land and external funds. Consequently,
the future ￿ows of direct and indirect (or collateral-based) rental payments to
land fall. As a result, in the period of the shock the price of land falls. This
reduces the value of land on impact and, hence, tightens even further the bor-
rowing constraint. The credit crunch is enhanced and revenue and internal fund
accumulation fall even more; and so on. This story is repeated again and again.
This is the static multiplier. It basically magni￿es the initial impact of the shock.
But this is not the end of the story. The reduction in internal fund accu-
mulation reduces the volume of collateral available for next period. Thus, the
borrowing constraint of next period is also tightened even if the shock has van-
ished and the lending rate has returned to its normal level. This propagates the
credit crunch or reduced availability of external funds into the next period. Hence,
household revenue and internal fund accumulation fall in the period following the
shock. And so on. The story told above is repeated in the periods after the shock.
This is the dynamic multiplier. It propagates into future periods the eﬀect of the
shock. The economy takes longer to converge back to the steady state than in a
￿nancially frictionless setup.
6. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
In this section the credit channel of the theoretical model is studied within a
numerical experiment that aims at replicating the negative productivity shock
endured by ￿nancial intermediaries in Colombia after the new banking regulation
was issued. First the assumptions (i.e. functional forms and parameter values)
for the numerical experiment are presented. Then the results are discussed.
6.1. Functional Forms and Parameter Values
For this experiment the following functional forms and assumptions are used:
￿ U(c)=l o g ( c)
￿ F(x,l,b)=xαl1−α + Ab
￿ z ￿ iid uniform [0,z]Note that external funds yield output through a linear technology while inter-
nal funds and land are combined in a Cobb-Douglas technology. As the reader
will see, this is just a simplifying assumption to facilitate the choice of parame-
ter values. If A =1the example reduces to the one suggested by Kocherlakota
(2000).
Under this setup external funds are neither a complement nor a substitute to
internal funds and land. As said earlier, the lack of complementarity between in-
ternal and external funds will reduce the kick obtained from the credit multipliers.
Yet, the multipliers are still present due to the complementarity between internal
funds and land. Recall that this complementarity assumption is enough to do the
trick.
Note that the loan demand decision is taken according to the following rule:
If A =( 1 + ρt)= ⇒ bt ∈ [0,∞]
If A > (1 + ρt)= ⇒ bt −→ ∞
If A < (1 + ρt)= ⇒ bt =0






where ε is an arbitrarily small number. In other words, A is constructed
so that it always exceeds the highest possible gross loan rate of the economy.
The important point to note is that, under these circumstances, in every period
the household will want the highest loan volume it can get. Consequently, its
borrowing constraint will be binding in every period:
bt =
qtlt +( 1− δ)xt
1+ρt
# t
In the technical appendix it is shown that a suﬃcient condition to satisfy the
no-bubble condition is βF2(xt,b t,l t) < (1 + ρt) # t. Under the present setup this
is equivalent to βA<(1+ρt) # t. To guarantee that this condition is satis￿ed at




− εwhere ρss is the steady state loan interest rate.













Each period should be thought of as a quarter. The value for R implies a
quarterly deposit interest rate of 1.9% which is equivalent to the average quar-
terly ex-post deposit real interest rate in Colombia for the period January/1990-
February/2000.22 This rate should be associated to the safe quarterly rate that
any depositor obtains in international ￿nancial markets. The value for z was cho-
sen so that the steady state quarterly loan interest rate is 3.9%, which coincides
with the average quarterly ex-post loan real interest rate in Colombia for the pe-
riod January/1990-Febreuary/2000.23 The value for ε implies a gross return to
loans (i.e. A)o f6 . 1 %i ne v e r yp e r i o da n dav a l u ef o rβ of 0.978. The quarterly
depreciation rate is set at 2.5% and the elasticity of ￿nal output to both internal
funds and land is 0.5. This last value was chosen as a benchmark so that output
is neither land nor internal fund intensive. One caveat regarding parameter val-
ues applies. These are just reasonable numbers used to implement a quantitative
exercise. There is no calibration whatsoever to long-run empirical regularities.
This is future work and so speci￿cq u a n t i t a t i v er e s p o n s e ss h o u l db et a k e nw i t h
caution.
6.2. Results
Initially the economy is set at its steady state ζss =( css,x ss,l ss,b ss,d ss,z ss,q ss,ρss),
which is the solution to:
bss =










22The corresponding annual rate is 8%.



















Once in steady state, z is given a one-time positive shock that induces a
one-time 50 basis point increase in the lending rate (ρ). The magnitude of the
corresponding fall in banking productivity (1−z) is 0.48%. In any case, the shock
drives the lending rate from 3.9% (its steady state value) to 4.4%. Recall that
these are quarterly rates. In annual terms the shock is equivalent to a rise in the
loan rate from 16.65% to 18.80%. Even though no de￿nitive stance is taken here
with regards to the magnitude of the shock observed in Colombia, looking at this
country￿s annual ex-post real loan rates shows that the average between Jan/1999
and Feb/2000 (the period right after the new regulation was issued) was 18.85%.
In contrast, the average for the period Jan/1990-Feb/2000 was 16.65%. Hence,
the magnitude of the shock used in this experiment mimics crudely the negative
productivity shock suﬀered by ￿nancial intermediaries in Colombia after the new
banking regulation of Nov/1998 was implemented.24
In the period following the shock z goes back to its unconditional mean and
the loan rate falls back to its stationary 3.9% level. The use of a one time shock
instead of a persistent or longer lived one is necessary to isolate the propagation
features of the credit channel. The response of the arti￿cial economy is obtained
by solving this economy￿s (P1) and (P2) in the context of a recursive competitive
equilibrium. The solution to (P1) was obtained with the linear-quadratic method.
Figure 8 shows the response to the shock of i) internal funds (x), ii) asset prices (q),
24Why not use a shock to z so that (1 + ρ)/(1 + R) r i s e s3 0 % ,a so b s e r v e di nt h ed a t a ?
Again, bacause other factors might have played a role in this 30% ￿gure and ￿ltering out those
components attributable to phenomena other than the new regulation is complicated. In fact,
with a shock of such magnitude the model blows away.iii) the loan rate (ρ), iv) the loan volume (b),v )o u t p u t(Y ) and vi) consumption
(c).
Table 2 presents the percent deviation from steady state of variables ρ,x,q,b,Y
and c during the ten periods that follow the shock. On impact, asset prices (q),
credit (b) and output (Y ) fall almost 9% while consumption (c) falls only 7%.
This is a consequence of the household￿s desire to smooth consumption. Yet, the
real loan rate (ρ) only rose 50 basis points (a 12.82% increase25). Note also that
the shock vanishes immediately and the loan rate returns to its stationary level
in the period following the shock. Yet, internal funds (x),a s s e tp r i c e s(q),t h e
loan volume (b), output (Y ) and consumption (c) remain considerably depressed
and below their stationary levels for several periods after the shock. For instance,
in the period following the shock internal funds (x) fall more than 12%. This is
expected because in order to smooth consumption after a negative income shock,
the household cuts internal fund accumulation. A very interesting response is that
of consumption. As evidenced from table 2 the response of consumption displays
a hump. Consumption falls contemporaneously with the shock but falls even more
in the period after the shock. Furthermore, in the following periods consumption
remains below its impact or shock-period level.
TABLE 2: Percent Deviations from Steady State
period ↓ /v a r i a b l e−→ ρ x q b Y c
t +12.82% 0 -8.79% -8.91% -8.89% -7.06%
t + 1 0 -12.42% -8.63% -8.77% -8.77% -8.79%
t + 2 0 -12.20% -8.48% -8.61% -8.61% -8.63%
t + 3 0 -11.97% -8.32% -8.46% -8.45% -8.47%
t + 4 0 -11.76% -8.17% -8.31% -8.30% -8.32%
t + 5 0 -11.55% -8.03% -8.16% -8.15% -8.17%
t + 6 0 -11.34% -7.88% -8.01% -8.00% -8.02%
t + 7 0 -11.13% -7.74% -7.86% -7.86% -7.87%
t + 8 0 -10.93% -7.60% -7.72% -7.72% -7.73%
t + 9 0 -10.73% -7.46% -7.58% -7.58% -7.59%
25This is equivalent to a 0.48% rise in the gross loan rate (1 + ρ) and also to a 0.48% fall in
banking productivity (1 − z).Are these responses of the arti￿cial economy similar to those observed in
Colombia after the new banking regulation was implemented? Between the ￿rst
quarter of 1999 and the third quarter of 2000 real GDP in Colombia has been, on
average, 5.24% below its pre-1998:III trend, with a maximum deviation of -6.3% in
the second quarter of 1999.26 This is less than what the arti￿cial economy displays.
Between December of 1998 and January of 2001 stock prices in the Colombian
economy have fallen a little more than 40% in real terms. This is a considerable
plunge but still below what the arti￿cial economy predicts (66%). Between De-
cember of 1998 and January of 2001 total real credit in Colombia was crunched
30%. This number is also overshot by the prediction of the arti￿cial economy
(67%). But, again, speci￿c quantitative results from the arti￿cial economy should
be taken cautiously given that the model was not calibrated to long-run empirical
regularities. Moreover, available macroeconomic data for the period following the
new banking regulation (the shock) is limited given that it was only implemented
two and a half years ago. One caveat also applies. Parameter alpha was set at
0.5 so as to avoid any bias towards land or internal fund intensiveness. A proper
choice of alpha can yield results more close to those in the data.
In any case, the results are illustrative of the propagation and ampli￿cation
features of the model because this speci￿c setup allows the borrowing constraint to
articulate an extreme case of ampli￿cation and propagation. Indeed, if there were
no ￿nancial friction and the borrowing constraint were slack, the level of external
funds (b) would not aﬀect the level of household revenue and consumption.27 The
reason is simple. For the credit constraint to be slack, it must be the case that
A =1+ρ. Thus, the net gain from receiving an additional unit of b is zero. This
is diﬀerent to the binding constraint case where the net gain from an additional
unit of b is A−(1+ρ) > 0. In consequence, in the absence of a binding borrowing
constraint the one-time shock to intermediation costs z and the corresponding
gross loan rate hike drive to zero the volume of loans on impact (because with
the shock A<1+ρ). However, household revenue, internal fund accumulation
and consumption remain unchanged as net resources for the household do not
change. Asset prices also remain unchanged because the future ￿ow of direct
rental payments to land (i.e. of marginal productivity of land) has not changed
and, since the credit constraint is always slack, the future ￿ow of indirect (or
collateral-based) rental payments to land is zero and has not changed either. In
26The deviations from trend are: 99:I=-4.5%, 99:II=-6.3%, 99:III=-5.5%, 99:IV=-5.4%, 00:I=-
4.7%, 00:II=5.5%, 00:III=-4.9%.
27Also, the level of external funds demanded and supplied is indeterminate.the period following the shock the gross loan rate returns to its stationary level
and the loan volume may jump to any level because its value is indeterminate.
Yet, household revenue, internal fund accumulation, asset prices and consumption
remain unchanged. Contrarily, if the borrowing constraint binds, the shock gives
birth to a long-lived and more than proportional response in every macroeconomic
variable. Hence, the ￿nancial friction arising from a binding borrowing constraint
introduces an extreme case of ampli￿c a t i o na n dp r o p a g a t i o ni nt h i se c o n o m yd u e
to the credit channel explained in section 5.
7. CONCLUSION
Economic performance in Colombia during the last three years has been disap-
pointing. The unemployment rate is currently above 15%. The average economic
growth rate for the years 1998,1999 and 2000 was negative. Asset prices have
been falling since the end of 1997. This situation contrasts with the early nineties
when Colombia grew at rates exceeding 4% and was catalogued as one of the top
emerging markets in the world. This economic downturn has been accompanied
by a severe crisis in the ￿nancial sector that began in the end of 1997 or early
1998. Indeed, real credit suﬀered a severe crunch starting in January of 1998 and
the real loan rate took a big hike around the same time. In order to alleviate ￿-
nancial distress and to ￿nance the bail-out, the Colombian government issued new
banking regulation towards the end of 1998. Whether ￿nancial distress in Colom-
bia was alleviated or not is a question that has not yet been answered. What
is true though is that in January of 1999, less than two months after the new
regulation was issued, the spread between the domestic loan and deposit interest
rates increased considerably.
This paper argues that this hike in the loan-deposit interest rate spread re-
￿ects a rise in intermediation costs attributable to the new banking regulation.
The new regulation and the 2/1000 ￿nancial transaction tax tightened banking
operational constraints and added costs to ￿nancial intermediation activity. Con-
sequently, ￿nancial intermediaries suﬀered a productivity meltdown as they lost
operational versatility and additional real resources were required to implement
and continue to operate under the new regulations and tax. As a result, ￿nancial
intermediaries had to charge a higher loan-deposit interest rate spread in equilib-
rium, as observed in the data. While aimed at alleviating ￿nancial distress, the
new regulation ended up reducing the productivity of ￿nancial intermediaries and
increasing intermediation costs.Not surprisingly, this negative productivity shock enhanced the credit crunch
and corresponding economic contraction that was already underway. The en-
hancement, however, did not proceed in a linear way. The data show that the
eﬀects of the shock were ampli￿ed and propagated into the future. Speci￿cally,
the contraction of GNP became wider and longer lived than most previous down-
ward economic ￿uctuations. Asset prices maintained a downward trend. Real
credit was further crunched after a slight recovery in the third quarter of 1998.
Additionally, the real loan rate displayed another peak around the time of the
new regulation. In sum, the macroeconomic eﬀects of the initial credit crunch
and ￿nancial distress were signi￿cantly ampli￿ed and propagated after the new
banking regulation and ￿nancial transaction tax were implemented.
This paper suggests a general equilibrium, ￿nancial accelerator model that
incorporates an explicit technology for the intermediary sector and explains how
a negative productivity shock to ￿nancial intermediaries is ampli￿ed and propa-
gated due to credit constraints. This ￿nancial imperfection articulates static and
dynamic credit multipliers that amplify and propagate productivity shocks to ￿-
nancial intermediaries. The credit channel arises because of borrowing constraints
that depend on asset prices, internal funds and lending rates. The transmission
mechanism is triggered by a rise in lending rates that tightens borrowing con-
straints on impact. The credit crunch is magni￿e da n dp r o p a g a t e db yaf a l li n
asset prices and internal fund accumulation that accompanies the lower level of
economic activity and that further tightens the credit limit on impact and in the
future. The qualitative predictions of the model are in line with the recent behav-
ior of macroeconomic variables in Colombia if one accepts that the new banking
regulation of 1998 was a negative productivity shock to its ￿nancial system. In
short, due to the new regulation and to ￿nancial imperfections (speci￿cally credit
constraints), what otherwise would have been a regular and short-lived economic
contraction, became the biggest economic downfall of recent Colombian history.
Some questions and issues remain open for further research. It seems reason-
able to think that the ￿nancial sector is constantly exposed to productivity shocks.
If so, why did credit limits or ￿nancial imperfections kick in only with this last
productivity shock? In other words, why did previous productivity shocks to ￿-
nancial intermediaries not generate large and persistent ￿uctuations as the one
recently observed in Colombia? Maybe previous shocks were negligible or really
small and did not generate signi￿cant real eﬀects. After all, the last shock stems
from major regulatory changes in the banking arena. Another possibility is that
borrowing constraints did not bind when previous shocks arrived. In contrast,the last shock arrived in the middle of an economic contraction and credit crunch
when credit limits are more likely to be binding. These are just tentative answers
to be explored in further research.
Another issue that arises has to do with the life-span of the productivity shock
from the new banking regulation. Is this shock transitory or permanent? If it
is transitory, is it also very persistent? If the shock is permanent or transitory
but very persistent then the enhanced macroeconomic eﬀects that are observed in
Colombia need not be the result of a ￿nancial friction but simply a direct conse-
quence of the life-span of the shock. It would be diﬃcult to argue that the shock
was perceived as permanent since the new regulation was issued as an emergency
mechanism to temporarily alleviate ongoing ￿nancial distress and to ￿nance the
bail-out of troubled institutions. The regulation is still operating but some of
its decrees (especially the ￿nancial transaction tax) are expected to disappear at
some point in the future, as initially announced by the government. On the other
hand, evaluating the persistence of the shock is diﬃcult because new elements have
been added to the original regulation after it was implemented in November 17 of
1998. For instance, the government recently decreed an increase of the ￿nancial
transaction tax rate from 2 per 1000 to 3 per 1000. In any case, it is reasonable
to assume that ￿nancial intermediaries eventually ￿nd a way to adapt to the new
regulation until the associated productivity eﬀects vanish completely. If so, the
shock should not be very persistent and the credit multipliers articulated by the
borrowing constraint are relevant in explaining the ampli￿cation and propagation
of the shock, as observed in the data. Again, this is just a tentative answer. A
rigorous evaluation of the life-span of the shock is left for future research.8. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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257-264.9. TECHNICAL APPENDIX
In this appendix I show the derivation of equation (7). Equation (6), which
dictates optimality in land accumulation, is:
qtU
 (ct)=βEt{U
 (ct+1)[F3(xt+1,b t+1,l t+1)+qt+1 (6)












Let Ωt = F2(xt,b t,l t)/(1 + ρt). With this notation equation (6.1) is:
qtU
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Note that a suﬃcient condition for (6.8) to hold is:




! 1 ∀t10. DATA APPENDIX
￿ GDP cycle: Seasonally adjusted quarterly gross domestic product in mil-
lions of 1994 pesos (quarterly values are not annualized). Seasonal adjust-
ment was done with the X-11 ARIMA method. Linear trend was calcu-
lated by ￿tting an OLS line between seasonally adjusted GDP in 1977:I
and 1998:II. HP trend was calculated with λ = 1600. Source is DANE in
Colombia. Period is 1977:I-2000:III.
￿ Asset prices in real terms (Dec./97=100): Monthly closing value of
the Bogota Stock Market Index (IBB). To de￿ate and obtain the real values
the CPI (1998:12 =100) was used. Resulting values were normalized by the
December/1997 value. Source is Banco de la Republica in Colombia. Period
is 1991:01-2001:01.
￿ Real credit volume (Dec./97=100): Monthly opening value in mil-
lions of pesos of the total stock of credit (gross and net of non-performing
loans) from the ￿nancial system [Banks, Savings and Mortgage Loan In-
stitutions (CAV), Financial Corporations (CF), Companies of Commercial
Finance (CFC), Leasing Companies, Cooperative Organisms and Special In-
stitutions]. To de￿ate and obtain the real values the CPI (1998:12 =100)
was used. Each observation was normalized by the December/1997 value.
Source is Banco de la Republica in Colombia. Period is 1992:01-2001:06.
￿ Real loan rate: Monthly values of the ex-post real annual loan interest
rate. This rate is calculated as (1+il)/(1 +π)−1,w h e r eil is the observed
nominal annual loan interest rate and π is the realized annual in￿ation rate.
The nominal annual loan rate used is ￿tasa activa total sistema￿ (monthly
average) calculated by Superintendencia Bancaria in Colombia. In￿ation
rates were calculated with the CPI (1998:12 =100). Source is Banco de la
Republica. Period is 1990:01-2000:02.
￿ Loan/deposit interest rate spreads: Monthly basis point diﬀerence be-
tween the nominal annual loan interest rate and the nominal annual 3-month
COD interest rate: il −id. The nominal annual loan rate is ￿tasa activa to-
tal sistema￿ (monthly average) calculated by Superintendencia Bancaria in
Colombia. The nominal annual 3-month COD rate is ￿tasa de interes de
los CDT a 90 dias, total sistema￿ (monthly average). Source is Banco de la
Republica. Period is 1990:01-2000:12.￿ Inverse productivity of ￿nancial system: Monthly ratio between the
gross nominal annual loan interest rate and the gross nominal annual 3-
month COD interest rate: (1+il)/(1+id). The nominal annual loan rate is
￿tasa activa total sistema￿ (monthly average) calculated by Superintenden-
cia Bancaria in Colombia. The nominal annual 3-month COD rate is ￿tasa
de interes de los CDT a 90 dias, total sistema￿ (monthly average). Source
is Banco de la Republica. Period is 1986:01-2000:12.
￿ Labor productivity of ￿nancial system: Quarterly ratio between the
opening real stock of credit (in millions of pesos and gross of non-performing
loans) and the number of employees in the ￿nancial sector in the seven main
metropolitan areas. To de￿ate and obtain real credit values the CPI (1998:12
=100) was used. Source for employment is DANE - Encuesta Nacional de
Hogares. Source for credit volume is Banco de la Republica. Period is
3/1/1992-12/1/2000.11. FIGURES
Figure 1a
Quarterly GDP vs. Linear Trend


























































































































































































































































































































































































N e to fN P LFigure 4
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